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1. Introduction 
 
Sometimes a picture is worth 1,000 words. This is the case with Figure 1 which 
shows the 10-year government bond spreads of the countries that entered the 
Eurozone in 1999 (Greece in 2002). The spreads are defined as the difference 
between the 10-year government bond yields of a particular country and the 
German 10-year government bond yield. 
We observe dramatic changes during 1999-2017. During the 1990s the spreads 
were large but declining as the date of the start of EMU approached. During that 
period these spreads reflected mainly devaluation risks. At the moment the 
countries entered the Eurozone, these spreads all but disappeared as the 
devaluation risks had dissipated.  
The financial crisis that erupted in 2008 was a wake-up call in the government 
bond markets of the Eurozone and led to large increases in the spreads. 
Suddenly the financial markets discovered that there were also liquidity and 
solvency risks attached to the holdings of sovereign bonds in the Eurozone. The 
spreads of a number of countries surged reflecting these risks that financial 
markets had forgotten about. These were the risks that the sovereigns in a 
monetary union can run out of cash and be driven into default. 
It is immediately clear from Figure 1 that the countries whose currencies 
experienced devaluation risks in the 1990s were also the countries that 
experienced sovereign debt crises in 2010-12. The question we want to analyze 
here is the following.  Are the devaluation risks of the 1990s good predictors of 
the sovereign debt risks that emerged during the Eurozone crisis of 2010-12? 
This question can be phrased somewhat more provocatively as follows: did the 
sovereigns that got into trouble during the sovereign debt crisis of 2010-12 carry 
an “original sin”1 that, during the 1990s, showed up in the form of frequent 
foreign exchange crises?  
                                                        
1 The concept of “original sin” has been applied by Eichengreen, et al. (2002) to 
characterize the  fragility of Latin-American sovereigns forced to issue debt in 
dollars.   
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Figure 1: Spreads of 10-year government bond yields (%) vis-à-vis Germany 
(1991-2017)  
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
In this paper we try to answer this question. The question is important because if 
the answer is positive there is a lot of determinism about the question of 
whether countries belong to the periphery and thus are likely to get in trouble in 
the future again. It is very difficult to escape an “original sin”.   
This analysis will lead us to study the fragility of the Eurozone and to discuss 
how the Eurozone can be stabilized.  
 
2. Is there an original sin? 
 
In order to answer this question we correlate the spreads observed during the 
1990s and those observed during the financial crisis. We plot the results in 
Figure 2.  On the horizontal axis we show the mean spreads during 1991-99 and 
on the vertical axis the mean spreads during the period 2010-12. We find a 
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strong correlation, i.e. the spreads observed in the 1990s are good predictors of 
the spreads observed during the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone.  Thus, 
countries that got into trouble during the foreign exchange crises in the 1990s 
are broadly the same as those that got into trouble during sovereign debt crisis. 
In addition, the intensity of the foreign exchange crises is highly correlated with 
the intensity of the subsequent sovereign debt crisis. This is quite remarkable 
because it took 10 years for this correlation to appear. Everybody seems to have 
been sleeping unaware of these simmering risks. 
 
 
 
Note: Own calculations using Eurostat data  
 
Thus, from the preceding analysis it appears that the “periphery” countries that 
appear both in the group of countries experiencing devaluation risks in the 
1990s and in the group of countries hit by sovereign debt crises carry the burden 
of some “original sin”. The latter appears to drive them into foreign exchange 
crises when they have a fixed exchange rate and into sovereign debt crises when 
they are in a monetary union.   
Before analyzing the nature of this “original sin” it is worth asking the question 
of whether there are exceptions to this correlation of foreign exchange and 
sovereign debt crises. The answer is, yes, there are. We show the cases of Ireland 
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and Finland in Figure 2. Ireland was not among the group of  countries 
experiencing foreign exchange crises in the 1990s, yet it was drawn into a severe 
sovereign debt crisis in 2010. Thus in a way Ireland got drawn into a sovereign 
debt crisis, without having “sinned originally”. The reverse is true for Finland. 
Despite foreign exchange crises in the 1990s Finland did not experience a 
sovereign debt crisis. It looks like Finland escaped from the “original sin”. We 
conclude that one should not apply the Calvinistic theory of “predestination” 
here: countries with an original sin can find redemption; countries without 
original sin can be punished by a sovereign debt crisis. We come back to this 
issue when we ask the question ho strong this original sin is.  
Did the original sin continue to do its work after 2012, the year when the ECB 
saved the Eurozone with its OMT-program? We give an answer in Figure 3. This 
shows the same spreads during the 1990s on the horizontal axis and the average 
spreads in 2017, five years after the end of the sovereign debt crisis. It is now 
clear from this figure that the correlation  is at least as strong as in Figure 2. Thus 
it appears that on average countries that in some distant past have committed 
sins continue to be punished for a long time.  What then is the nature of this 
original sin? We turn to this question in the next section. 
 
 
Note: Own calculations using Eurostat data 
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3. The nature of the original sin: the German School 
 
Why do some countries appear to carry the burden of the original sin for so long? 
Here is the German answer. When political and legal institutions are weak it is 
difficult to maintain fiscal discipline. That in turn leads to macroeconomic and 
monetary instability, characterized by large government deficits and increasing 
government debt. When countries with weak governance issue their own money, 
this will typically lead to high and variable inflation, leading to depreciating 
currencies.  When these countries peg their exchange rates, as many EU-
countries did in the 1980s and 1990s, this leads to frequent speculative crises 
followed by devaluations. Finally, when these countries join a monetary union 
without strengthening their political institutions, the pressure will be mainly on 
the government finance. Ultimately, this will lead to a sovereign debt crisis. In 
this view; the crises have the same source: weak governance.  
This German view has provided the analytical framework for the Stability and 
Growth Pact that is deemed to be essential in disciplining national governments 
in a monetary union. It is probably the most influential analysis of the question of 
why some countries end up in the periphery, and others in the core. But is it 
really convincing? It it is, we would expect that Eurozone countries that 
accumulated a lot of government debt prior to the sovereign debt crisis also 
were hit most by this crisis when it erupted in 2010. In other words, we should 
find that the public debt accumulation is a good predictor of the subsequent 
sovereign debt crisis. In Figure 4 we show some evidence.  On the horizontal axis 
we set out the change in public debt (in percent of GDP) of member countries 
during 1999-2007, the period preceding the financial crisis. We observe that 
most of the Eurozone countries saw their public debt decline prior to the crisis. 
On the vertical axis we set out the government bond yields of the same countries 
in 2012, when the sovereign debt crisis was at its peak. It is our measure of the 
intensity of the sovereign debt crisis. We observe that the public debt 
accumulation prior to the crisis is a weak predictor of the subsequent sovereign 
debt crisis. 
Next we asked the question of whether private debt accumulation prior to the 
crisis is a better predictor of the sovereign debt crisis. The answer is given in 
7 
Figure 5. On the horizontal axis we show the change in private debt prior to the 
crisis (as a percent of GDP); on the vertical axis we present the same measure of 
the intensity of the sovereign debt crisis, i.e. the yields on 10-year government 
bonds in 2017. We note that contrary to the public debt, the private debt 
increased significantly before the eruption of the crisis. 
 
  
Source: Eurostat 
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We find quite surprisingly that private debt accumulation before the financial 
crisis is a good predictor of the sovereign debt crisis, i.e. those countries that 
tended to accumulate more private debt before the crisis were more likely to 
experience a public debt crisis later.  That does not seem to give much support to 
the German discipline school.  Only the cases of Greece and Portugal seem to be 
consistent with this school of thought. We observe that in these two countries 
both private and public debt increased significantly (in both cases, however, 
private debt increased faster than public debt).  
From the preceding we conclude that, with the possible exception of Greece and 
Portugal, the “low-discipline-original-sin” may explain the foreign exchange 
crises of the 1990s but fails to explain the sovereign debt crises that emerged in 
2010. The latter may have little to do with an original sin condemning periphery 
countries to be hit by a sovereign debt crisis2.  
How can we make sense of this? We attempt to answer this question in some 
detail in the next section, but here is the bottom line. The financial crisis that 
erupted in 2008 was a classical case of a boom-bust that capitalism has produced 
quite often in history. These classical boom-bust episodes have been analysed by, 
among others, Kindleberger(1978) and Minsky(1986).  During the boom phase 
optimism and euphoria dominate, blinding consumers and investors in 
perceiving risks. As a result, consumption and investment soar, made possible by 
excessive bank credit granted by equally euphoric bankers. This typically leads 
to bubbles in asset markets, until the crash hits. Then many consumers and firms 
(including banks) are saddled with unsustainable debt. A process of deleveraging 
is set in motion leading to a deep recession. That’s when governments have to 
step in in order to save the market system. Banks and firms have to be rescued, 
unemployed have to be paid, leading governments to issue debt. The countries 
that have experienced the most intense booms and bubbles also experience the 
deepest crashes, forcing the governments of these countries to issue an 
unsustainable level of public debt. In a monetary union such a boom-bust 
                                                        
2 In De Grauwe and Ji(2012) we provide econometric evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that fundamental budgetary variables, such as the government debt 
ratios perform poorly in explaining the dramatic increases of the government 
bond yields during 2010-12   
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scenario leads to additional problems to which we now turn. We keep in mind 
though that maybe something else is going on than an original sin determining 
the fate of periphery countries in the Eurozone. 
A note of warning is in place here. The preceding does not mean that some 
countries of the periphery may not have deep-seated governance problems. They 
have. It means that these governance problems are not good predictors of the 
sovereign debt crises that erupted in 2010.  
 
4. Booms and busts in the Eurozone 
It is well-known that monetary unions cannot easily deal with asymmetric 
shocks (Mundell(1961)). The surprising thing is that the nature of the 
asymmetric shocks that hit the Eurozone has been quite different from the 
traditional asymmetric shocks analyzed in the OCA-literature. In fact business 
cycles in the Eurozone have been relatively well synchronized. This is shown in 
Figure 6.  
We observe that most Eurozone countries were booming in the period 2000-07 
and experienced a downturn since then. If there was asymmetry it was in the 
amplitudes of the same cycle. Some countries (Ireland, Spain, Greece) 
experienced a very strong boom and later a deep and protracted recession. Other 
countries (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands)  experienced a much 
more modest period of booming conditions followed by less intense recessions.  
Germany stands out as having experienced booms and busts with the lowest 
amplitude. 
If there is asymmetry in the business cycle movements in the Eurozone it is in 
the amplitude of these cycles. This asymmetry led to a situation in which 
countries in the group experiencing the highest amplitudes first experienced an 
unsustainable boom, often accompanied by asset price bubbles and when the 
crash came, were hit very hard with deep recessions, leading to an explosion of 
government debt.  
 10 
The problem with the monetary union lies in the fact that it had great difficulties 
in dealing with the asymmetric occurrence of these boom-bust scenarios, for two 
reasons. 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Note: the business component is obtained by applying a HP-filter to observed 
GDP. 
 
First, the European monetary union lacks a mechanism that can deal with boom-
bust scenarios with different amplitudes. These lead to divergent developments 
with large external imbalances, which crystallize in the fact that some countries 
built up current account deficits and other current account surpluses. 
When these imbalances had to be redressed, it appeared that the mechanisms to 
redress these in the Eurozone (“internal devaluations”) are very costly in terms 
of growth and employment, leading to social and political upheavals. Countries 
that have their own currency and that are faced with such imbalances can 
devalue or revalue their currencies. In a monetary union, countries facing 
external deficits are forced into intense expenditure reducing policies that 
inevitably lead to rising unemployment and much hardship to million of people.  
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This problem has been recognized by the economists that pioneered the theory 
of optimal currency areas (Mundell(1961), McKinnon(1963), Kenen(1969)).  
In Figures 7 and 8 we show one dimension of these imbalances. Figure 7 shows 
the evolution of the relative unit labour costs in the periphery countries. It shows 
how these countries experienced a massive reduction in competitiveness 
(increase in relative unit labour costs) produced by unsustainable booms that 
tended to raise prices and wages relative to other member countries. After the 
crash they were forced to adjust with large internal devaluations. These 
introduced strong deflationary forces leading to deep recessions and large 
increases in unemployment. From Figure 8 we observe that the core countries 
did not lose competiveness during the boom years. After the crash they also did 
not reflate their economies which would have led to internal revaluations. As a 
result, the whole of the adjustment costs was borne by the periphery (deficit) 
countries.  
That’s when the second problem of the Eurozone stepped in.  As stressed by De 
Grauwe (2011) the fragility of the Eurozone arises from the fact that member 
countries of the monetary union issue debt in a currency they have no control 
over.  As a result, the governments of these countries can no longer guarantee 
that the cash will always be available to roll over the government debt. This lack 
of guarantee provided by Eurozone governments in turn can trigger self-fulfilling 
liquidity crises (a sudden stop) that can degenerate into solvency problems. 
When this occurs it leads to a massive outflow of liquidity from the problem 
countries, making it impossible for the governments of these countries to fund 
the rollover of their debt at reasonable interest rate.  
This dynamics can force countries into a bad equilibrium characterized by 
increasing interest rates that trigger excessive austerity measures, which in turn 
lead to a deflationary spiral that aggravates the fiscal crisis (see De 
Grauwe(2011) and De Grauwe and Ji(2012)).  This is exactly what happened 
during the sovereign debt crisis in 2010-12. Markets singled out these countries, 
leading to massive capital outflows from the first group of countries to the 
second one.  The whole of the Eurozone was destabilized. This problem risks 
popping up each time the Eurozone is pushed into a recession. Each time some 
12 
countries will be hit more than others. As a result, large internal capital flows 
risk further destabilizing the system. 
 
Figure 7: Relative unit labour costs in periphery Eurozone (2000=100)  
 
 
Figure 8: Relative unit labour costs in core Eurozone (2000=100) 
 
Source: European Commission, AMECO 
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The absence of a backstop for the sovereign in a monetary union also creates the 
possibility of generating a “deadly embrace” between the sovereign and the 
banking sector. When the sovereign is pushed into a bad equilibrium it becomes 
very likely that the domestic banks will experience solvency problems because 
they are the major holders of the sovereign bonds. A hellish doom loop is set in 
motion where the sovereign debt crisis engenders a banking crisis. The reverse 
causality is equally possible, as the Irish crisis has demonstrated: a domestic 
banking crisis forces the sovereign to step in to save the banking system. This 
typically requires the government to take on more debt thereby creating a risk of 
insolvency.  
From the preceding discussion we conclude that, with the possible exception of 
Greece and Portugal,  the countries that were hit by the sovereign debt crisis in 
2010 did not carry a burden of some “original sin” produced by weak political 
institutions that made it impossible for them to avoid the crisis in the Eurozone.  
 
5. There is no original sin 
The next question then is why we found the high correlation between the foreign 
exchange crises of the 1990s and the sovereign debt crises of 2010-12. A 
possible answer runs as follows. The countries that experienced foreign 
exchange crises in the 1990s were indeed countries with a history of high and 
variable domestic inflations. This also had led to high real interest rates, that 
incorporated a high risk premium. When these countries were selected to enter 
the Eurozone, real interest rates started a process of steep declines. Such a 
decline did not occur in the countries with low inflation. As a result, at the start 
of the Eurozone a major asymmetric shock occurred.  Countries of the periphery 
(high inflation countries) were hit by a large decline in real interest rates. The 
latter had the effect of boosting their economies. In some of these countries this 
created an unsustainable boom, leading to a crash with all the consequences 
discussed earlier. This shock did not occur in the core countries. 
Thus, in a way the correlation we observed in Figure 2 and 3 is to a large extent a 
spurious one. The missing variable is the asymmetric shock in the real interest 
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rate that had the effect of pushing the periphery countries into an extreme 
boom-bust dynamics and forced the governments of these countries to increase 
their debts so as to save the market system in these countries. There is no need 
to invoke some dark force coming from weak governance and that condemned 
these countries onto a path of sovereign default once in the monetary union.  
The preceding  discussion makes clear that there is no deterministic law that 
ensures that the periphery countries will always be in the periphery and that the 
core countries are safely nested in the core. There are no “original sins”.  
Capitalism will continue to produce booms and busts and the impact of these 
booms and busts will continue to be different. We do not know which country 
will be on the right side of the fence in the next boom-bust phase. It could very 
well be some core countries that turn out to become periphery countries.  
What the previous discussion also makes clear is how unprepared the Eurozone 
was, and still is, to deal with boom-bust scenarios with different amplitudes. 
How should the Eurozone be reformed to ensure it is better able to withstand 
such a dynamics?   
 
6. Redesigning the Eurozone  
We identified two problems of the Eurozone. The first one arises from the fact 
that it has poor instruments to deal with asymmetric shocks. We will call this the 
OCA-problem. The second problem arises from the instability of the government 
bond markets in the Eurozone.  
 
6.1.  How to deal with the OCA problem?   
The standard response derived from the theory of optimal currency areas is that 
member countries of a monetary union should do structural reforms so as to 
make their labour and product markets more flexible. By increasing flexibility 
through structural reforms the costs of adjustments to asymmetric shocks can be 
reduced and the Eurozone can become an optimal currency area. This has been a 
very influential idea and has led Eurozone countries into programs of structural 
reforms.  
 15 
It is often forgotten that although the theoretical arguments in favour of 
flexibility are strong the fine print of flexibility is often harsh. It implies wage 
cuts, less unemployment benefits, lower minimum wages, easier firing. Many 
people hit by structural reforms, resist and turn to parties that promise another 
way to deal with the problem, including an exit from the Eurozone.  From an 
economic point of view flexibility is the solution. From a social and political point 
of view flexibility can become a problem. Stressing flexibility too often as the way 
out of the conundrum risks creating enemies of the monetary union that as time 
moves on leads to an increasing political momentum favoring an exit from the 
union.  
The traditional OCA-analysis is based on the assumption that asymmetric shocks 
are typically permanent and structural in nature (a change in preferences, a 
supply shock). We have found, however, that most of the shocks hitting the 
Eurozone have been temporary and the result of a boom-bust scenario. They are 
also typically demand shocks. In De Grauwe and Ji(2016) we provided further 
evidence that business cycle shocks, albeit with different amplitudes, have been 
the dominant forces.   
The implications for the governance of the Eurozone from the finding of the 
overwhelming importance of the cyclical and temporary component of output 
growth is that efforts at stabilizing the business cycle should be strengthened 
relative to the efforts that have been made to impose structural reforms. We are 
not implying that structural reforms are unnecessary, but rather that efforts at 
creating mechanisms aiming at stabilizing the Eurozone business cycles should 
be strengthened.  
Inter-country versus inter-temporal smoothing 
There have been  many proposals made to create a fiscal space at the Eurozone 
level in the form of a common unemployment insurance system (see e.g. the Four 
Presidents report(2012), Enderlein, et al. (2012), Beblavy, et al.(2015), Alcidi 
and Thirion(2015), Benassy-Quéré, A., et al. (2018))3.  
                                                        
3 There is an older literature making similar proposals. See e.g. Italianer and 
Vanheukelen(1992), Hammond and von Hagen(1993) and Mélitz and 
Vori(1993). 
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Such an insurance system has both an inter-country and an inter-temporal 
insurance dimension. The inter-country dimension is easier to deal with. It is 
also the one that has received most of the attention in the past. When one 
country experiences a recession, and thus increasing unemployment, the other 
country experiences a boom, and declining unemployment. This facilitates the 
workings of the common unemployment insurance system. The booming 
country transfers resources to the country in a recession and thereby smoothens 
the business cycles in the two countries. Technically and politically such a 
system encounters relatively few problems.  
Problems arise when business cycles are relatively well synchronized but of very 
different amplitude in the different member countries. In that case most 
countries will tend to experience a recession at about the same time, but in some 
countries the recession will be mild in other very intense. This creates both an 
economic and a political problem. First, countries with a mild recession are 
asked to transfer resources to countries experiencing a stronger recession. This 
tends to reduce the intensity of the recession in the latter country at the expense 
of making it more intense in the former country. It is not clear that this is welfare 
improving. Second, it is likely to create important political problems in the 
former country that is asked to transfer resources when the economy is not 
doing well.  
The previous analysis suggests that common unemployment insurance schemes 
should put sufficient emphasis on smoothing over time. This can be achieved by 
allowing the common unemployment insurance scheme to accumulate deficits 
and surpluses over time. The fiscal rule that could be imposed is that the 
insurance scheme balances over the business cycle. 
In principle, inter-temporal smoothing could be done at the national level, by 
allowing the national budgets to do the job. However, the large differences in the 
amplitude in the business cycle movements makes such a purely national 
approach problematic, as it leads to large differences in the budget deficits and 
debt accumulation between countries. These differences quickly spillover into 
financial markets when countries that are hit very hard by a downward 
movement in output are subjected by sudden stops and liquidity crises. This is 
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likely to force them to switch off the automatic stabilizers in their national 
budgets (De Grauwe and Ji(2017)). In addition, these liquidity outflows are 
inflows in some other countries in the monetary union, typically those that are 
hit least by the recession4. Their economic conditions improve at the expense of 
the others. Stabilization of common business shocks with different amplitudes at 
the national level makes the system unstable.  
National stabilization efforts do not work and introduce an element of instability 
in a monetary union, mainly because it leaves the countries most hit by the 
business cycle shocks unable to stabilize. Thus when business cycle shocks 
dominate it will be necessary to follow a common approach to the stabilization of 
the business cycles. A budgetary union can provide this. By centralizing part of 
the national budgets into a common budget managed by a common political 
authority, the different increases in budget deficits following from a (common) 
recession translate into a budget deficit at the union level. As a result, the 
destabilizing flows of liquidity between countries disappear, and the common 
budgetary authority can allow the automatic stabilizers in the budget to do their 
role in smoothing the business cycle. In fact, because a common budget also 
generates implicit inter-country transfers the countries with the deepest 
recession will profit from the automatic stabilizing features of the common 
budget most. As a result, a common budget provides the most effective way to 
stabilize the business cycle.   
The previous discussion illustrates that there is an interaction between what we 
have called the OCA-problem and the fragility problem. It is because the 
government bond markets lack a backstop that they become unstable during 
recessions. This makes it impossible to use the automatic stabilizers at the 
national level, forcing the monetary union to provide stabilization at the union 
level.  
 
 
                                                        
4 This is confirmed by the empirical work of Furceriand Zdzienicka (2013) and 
Hoffmann and Nitschka (2012) who find that during recessions risk sharing 
through financial markets declines dramatically. 
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6.2 How to deal with the instability of the government bond markets? 
Let us now turn to the question of how to deal with the second problem of the 
Eurozone, the instability of the government bond markets.  
The ECB has a central role to play here. By promising to provide unlimited 
support in the government bond markets in times of crisis, it can stop liquidity 
crises that are likely to emerge each time the Eurozone experiences a recession; 
liquidity crises that destabilize the system leading to large capital outflows from 
some country to other countries in the same monetary union.  
The ECB recognized this problem when it started its OMT-program in 2012. This 
certainly helped to pacify financial markets at that time and avoided the collapse 
of the Eurozone.  We can clearly see from Figure 1 that when the OMT-program 
was announced the yields in the government bond markets of the periphery 
countries started a steep descent. The beauty of that announcement was that the 
ECB did not have to buy one euro in the government bond markets.  
The issue arises of how credible the OMT-program is for future use. The 
credibility problem arises from the fact that when using the OMT program the 
ECB will have to decide whether the crisis it is facing is due to a liquidity or a 
solvency problem. If it determines it is a liquidity problem it should step in; if it 
decides it is a solvency problem it should not. In the latter case the other 
governments should decide whether or not to support the troubled government.  
This creates political problems that the ECB cannot take on. It is generally very 
difficult to determine in real time whether the problem is due to lack of liquidity 
or to insolvency. The uncertainty surrounding liquidity versus solvency 
problems makes it difficult for the ECB to step in without creating political 
controversy. In the Greek crisis of 2015 the ECB decided that the Greek problem 
was one of insolvency of the Greek government and therefore it refused to 
support the Greek government bond market, precipitating the crisis and leading 
to intense political conflicts in the Eurozone.  
All this will lead to doubts about the willingness of the ECB to provide liquidity to 
future governments in times of crisis.  As a result, the credibility of OMT is 
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limited, which means that it is not a foolproof insurance mechanism that will 
stabilize the markets in future crises.  
This problem does not exist in standalone countries. The commitment of the 
central bank to support the sovereign of a standalone country in times of crises 
is unconditional mainly because in times of crisis the sovereign prevails over 
bureaucrats at the central bank. This may come at a price though, because it also 
implies that the credibility of the central banks’ commitment to price stability is 
less than 100%. Paradoxically, one may argue that the commitment of the ECB 
towards price stability is stronger than in standalone countries precisely because 
the commitment of the ECB towards the support of the 19 different national 
governments is weak.  
The only way to solve the lack of credibility of the ECB as lender of last resort in 
the government bond market is by creating a budgetary union that includes the 
consolidation of a significant part of the national debts into one Eurozone debt. 
This could be achieved by the issuance of Eurobonds that are backed by a joint 
liability of the issuing governments (see Delpla and von Weizsäcker (2010), De 
Grauwe and Moesen(2010)). Such a consolidation mimics the relation between 
the central bank and the government that exists in standalone countries. It 
makes the credibility of liquidity support of the sovereign watertight and 
eliminates the danger of destabilizing capital flows within the union. Clearly such 
a consolidation can only occur if it is embedded in a political union, characterized 
by a central government that has the democratic power to tax and to spend. 
These are very intrusive, if not revolutionary transformations of the Eurozone, 
for which there is little appetite today in official circles.  These have now taken 
for granted that a further significant budgetary union together with a political 
union in which the budgetary union must be embedded is out of reach for the 
foreseeable future (which undoubtedly is true). As a result, they tend to embrace 
technical solutions that can solve the problem while avoiding the need to create 
a budgetary and political union.  
One such technical solution is to create a “safe asset”. This was proposed recently  
by the ESRB(2018) based on research done by Brunnermeier, et al. (2016). It 
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was also one of the proposals made by the French-German group of economists 
(see Benassy-Quéré, A., et al. (2018); see also Pisani-Ferry(2013)).  
The essence of these proposals consists in the issuance of a new asset that would 
be backed by a portfolio of national government bonds. Each government, 
however, would remain fully responsible for the bonds it has issued. Thus there 
would be no joint liability as is the case with Eurobonds. This new “safe asset” 
would consist of two tranches, a senior and a junior tranche. The senior tranche 
(70% of the total issue) would be safe; the junior tranche (the remaining 30%) 
would carry a risk of sovereign default. Thus, if one or more governments default 
on their bonds the holders of the junior tranche would take the hit. The holders 
of the senior tranche would be safeguarded as long as the total of the defaults 
does not exceed more than 30% of the nationally issued bonds.  
How likely is it that these SBBSs will help to stabilize the Eurozone? Note that in 
the way we formulate the question we do not dispute that in normal times the 
creation of a safe asset may not increase the efficiency of the financial system in 
the Eurozone. It probably will do so by supplying a new type of asset that can 
provide for a better diversification of normal risks. The issue is whether the safe 
asset will be an instrument for dealing with systemic risks in times of crisis? Our 
answer is negative for the following reasons. 
First, the creation of a safe asset does not eliminate the national government 
bond markets. This is recognized by the proponents of a safe asset (see 
ESRB(2018) and Brunnermeier, et al.(2016)). In fact these proponents have 
made the continuing existence of national sovereign bond markets a key 
component of their proposal. According to the ESRB “the SBBS issuance requires 
price formation in sovereign bond markets to continue to be efficient” (p.33). 
The markets for sovereign bonds must remain large enough so as to maintain 
their liquidity. That is also why the ESRB proposes to limit the total SBBS 
issuance to at most 33% of the total outstanding stock of sovereign bonds.  
This constraint on the issue of SSBS implies that national sovereign bond 
markets will be “alive and kicking”. As a result, the major problem that we 
identified earlier, i.e. the potential for destabilizing capital flows across the 
borders of the monetary union will still be present. However, since the markets 
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of sovereign bonds will have shrunk the yields are likely to be more volatile 
during crisis periods. 
Second, we observe that during crises, the correlation pattern of yields changes 
dramatically. During normal times all yields are highly positively correlated. 
During crisis times, as investors are looking for safe havens, the yields in the safe 
assets tend to decline sharply and become negatively correlated with the high 
risk yields. This pattern was very pronounced during the sovereign debt crisis of 
2010-12. In their simulations of the risks involved in SBBSs Brunnermeier, et 
al.(2016) do take into account the fact that risks can be correlated. However, this 
correlation pattern is fixed, while during crisis periods correlation patterns 
change dramatically. We show this feature in Table 1 in appendix. We find that 
during the sovereign debt crisis of 2010-12, the government bond yields of the 
periphery countries were negatively correlated with the yields of the core (safe) 
countries like (Germany, Finland, France, Netherlands).  
The implication is that during crises it is very unlikely that the senior tranche in 
the SBBS can maintain its status of safe asset. It will consist of bonds investors 
dump and “safe-haven” bonds. The senior tranche will continue to depend on the 
cash flow generated by bonds that panicking investors deem to be extremely 
risky. The perception that this senior tranche is equally safe as the safe-haven 
sovereign bonds (e.g. German bonds) is very unlikely when markets are in panic 
mode.  As a result, it is also likely that investors will flee the senior tranches of 
the SBBS to invest in the “real  thing”, i.e. super safe sovereign national bonds. 
 
6.3 A banking union 
In order to cut the doom loop between the sovereign and the domestic banking 
sector it is now generally accepted that it is necessary to create a banking union 
in the Eurozone. This will make it possible to resolve banking crises at the union 
level thereby insulating the sovereign from the consequences of banking crises 
and also to eliminate the reverse link between sovereign and banking sector.  
Significant progress has been made in creating a banking union. Such a banking 
union consists of three components: common supervision, common resolution, 
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and common deposit insurance. The first component is a reality; the second one 
is partially realized; the third one is completely absent. The lack of progress in 
the second and third leg of the banking union is essentially due to the same 
factor as the lack of progress towards a budgetary union. These require a 
willingness to allow taxpayers of one country to take on commitments to help 
other countries. At this moment of history this willingness does not seem to be 
present.  
We can conclude that we are still far removed from a full banking union. The 
result of all this is that the Eurozone is still unprepared to face a major banking 
crisis.   
 
7. Conclusion  
We started this paper by observing that the countries that were hit by a 
sovereign debt crisis during 2010-12 were also the countries that during the 
19990s experienced foreign exchange crises. This led us to ask the question 
whether these countries (that we call periphery countries) carry the burden of 
some “original sin” that leads them into financial turbulences whether they are in 
the monetary union or not. We analyzed  the potential nature of this original sin. 
We argued, however, that the case for the existence of an “original sin”, and thus 
some deterministic force that condemns countries in the periphery to stay in the 
periphery indefinitely, is weak. We concluded that countries that are in the 
periphery today can become part of the core and vice versa. There is nothing 
deterministic about the question of which countries can be hit by crises.  
We analyzed how the Eurozone problems should be dealt with. We argued that 
the long run success of the Eurozone depends on a continuing process of political 
unification. Political unification is needed because the Eurozone has dramatically 
weakened  the power and legitimacy of nation states without creating a nation at 
the European level. This is particularly true in the field of stabilization 
Real stabilization of the Eurozone goes through two mechanisms. The first one is 
the willingness of the ECB to provide liquidity in the sovereign bond markets of 
the Eurozone during times of crisis. The ECB has set up its OMT-program to do 
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this. However, OMT is far from credible and is loaded with austerity conditions, 
which will be counterproductive when used during recessions (which is when 
crises generally occur). That is why a second mechanism is necessary. This 
consists in creating Eurobonds that are based on joint liability of the 
participating national governments. Without such joint liability it will not be 
possible to create a common sovereign bond market. The creation of such a 
common bond market is the conditio sine qua non for long-term stability of the 
Eurozone.  
The political willingness to go in this direction, however, is non-existent today. 
There is no willingness to provide a common insurance mechanism that would 
put taxpayers in one country at risk of having to transfer money to other 
countries. Under those conditions the sovereign bond markets in the Eurozone 
will continue to be prone to instability.  
Recently, proposals were made to use financial engineering as a tool to stabilize 
the Eurozone. Although some of these proposals, e.g. the “safe asset” proposal 
can be useful in contributing to more market efficiency in normal times, we 
argued that they will not contribute significantly in making the Eurozone more 
stable. The danger of these proposals is that they allow policymakers to believe 
that the objective of stability can be achieved by some technical wizardry 
without having to pay the price of a further transfer of sovereignty.  
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Appendix 
Table 1. Correlation of yields before crisis (2000M1-2009M12) 
 
 
Table 2. Correlation of yields during crisis (2010M1-2012M09) 
 
 
Table 3. Correlation of yields after crisis (2012M10-2017M12) 
 
Source: European Central Bank and authors’ own calculation 
Note: The yields are yields on 10-year government bonds 
 
Germany Finland Netherlands Austria France Belgium Italy Spain Ireland Portugal Greece
Germany 1.00
Finland 0.97 1.00
Netherlands 0.97 1.00 1.00
Austria 0.94 0.99 0.99 1.00
France 0.98 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.00
Belgium 0.95 1.00 0.99 1.00 0.99 1.00
Italy 0.89 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.96 0.98 1.00
Spain 0.94 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.99 1.00
Ireland 0.61 0.78 0.76 0.83 0.74 0.81 0.88 0.83 1.00
Portugal 0.90 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.87 1.00
Greece 0.68 0.83 0.82 0.87 0.80 0.86 0.92 0.88 0.96 0.91 1.00
Germany Finland Netherlands Austria France Belgium Italy Spain Ireland Portugal Greece
Germany 1.00
Finland 0.98 1.00
Netherlands 0.99 0.99 1.00
Austria 0.89 0.93 0.91 1.00
France 0.83 0.89 0.87 0.98 1.00
Belgium 0.45 0.58 0.54 0.74 0.80 1.00
Italy -0.66 -0.57 -0.58 -0.34 -0.21 0.28 1.00
Spain -0.62 -0.60 -0.55 -0.48 -0.34 0.02 0.81 1.00
Ireland 0.16 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.38 0.68 0.38 0.44 1.00
Portugal -0.62 -0.52 -0.54 -0.32 -0.19 0.29 0.88 0.73 0.54 1.00
Greece -0.82 -0.79 -0.78 -0.62 -0.50 -0.13 0.81 0.81 0.23 0.85 1.00
Germany Finland Netherlands Austria France Belgium Italy Spain Ireland Portugal Greece
Germany 1.00
Finland 1.00 1.00
Netherlands 1.00 1.00 1.00
Austria 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00
France 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00
Belgium 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.00
Italy 0.92 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.95 0.95 1.00
Spain 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.97 1.00
Ireland 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.99 1.00
Portugal 0.78 0.78 0.79 0.82 0.83 0.85 0.93 0.93 0.92 1.00
Greece 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.35 0.34 0.38 0.45 0.58 0.55 0.57 1.00
